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LIMITATION AND PRESCRIPTION: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY, 
edited by Harry Dondorp, David Ibbetson, Eltjo J. H. Schrage 
(Duncker & Humblot 2019), ISBN 978-3-428-55626-7, 679 pp., 
€109.90. 
 
To the uninitiated, it would seem that prescription, as a source 
of comparative law, is not as rich as other areas of study. After all, 
numbers are mere expressions of the universal mathematical lan-
guage. The selection of a number for any particular “prescription” 
is equally arbitrary (and necessary) in civil law, common law, and 
mixed jurisdictions.1 It has often been lamented, including by the 
subject book’s editors, that “[s]urprisingly little academic attention 
has been devoted traditionally to the doctrine of limitation as a gen-
eral topic,”2 especially until the late-twentieth century. The editors 
rightly acknowledge exceptions to that gap,3 and recent Continental 
law reforms, including in France and in Germany, have engendered 
renewed interest since the turn of this past century.4  
 
 1. Douglas Nichols, Contra Non Valentem, 56 LA. L. REV. 337, 347 (1995) 
(“Civilians and common-law scholars alike concede that prescription and limita-
tions are as arbitrary as they are necessary”). 
 2. LIMITATION AND PRESCRIPTION: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY 3 
(Harry Dondorp, David Ibbetson & Eltjo J. H. Schrage eds., Duncker & Humblot 
2019). 
 3. Id. (citing, e.g., REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, COMPARATIVE FOUNDATIONS 
OF A EUROPEAN LAW OF SET-OFF AND PRESCRIPTION (2002)). 
 4. See, e.g., François-Xavier Licari, Le nouveau droit français de la pres-
cription extinctive à la lumière d’expériences étrangères récentes ou en gestation 
(Louisiane, Allemagne, Israël), 61 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ  
[RIDC] 739 (2009); Francis Limbach, Droit français et allemand de la prescrip-
tion: zones de lumière et zones d’ombre, 42 REVUE LAMY DROIT DES AFFAIRES 
105 (2009); Dossier Dalloz, Réforme de la prescription (loi no. 2008-561 du 17 
juin 2008 portant Réforme de la prescription en matière civile). One regrettable 
feature of the work is the absence of Louisiana law, which is ample and a fertile 
ground for discussion as a mixed jurisdiction. While the work does analyze other 
mixed jurisdictions (especially Scotland), there are unique aspects of prescription 
in Louisiana—especially as it relates to grounds for suspension and interruption—
that would have provided useful opportunity for commentary. For example, the 
longer than usual gap between Louisiana’s general one-year liberation prescrip-
tive period for most tort claims and the ten-year period for most contract claims 
likely gives rise to more opportunities to invoke suspension including through 




For some time, limitation and prescription got short shrift—ow-
ing either to inherently flawed efforts to attempt interpretation out 
of something that is so “numerical, mathematical, [and] automatic” 
or to the fact that at least in most civil law jurisdictions, prescription 
“is relegated to the end of the Code, as if to challenge the great com-
mentators to reach it before they run out of breath or die.”5 Through 
the intrepid efforts of editors Harry Dondorp, David Ibbetson, and 
Eltjo J. H. Schrage, Limitation and Prescription: A Comparative Le-
gal History is evidence of a groundswell in scholarship focusing on 
limitations and prescription from historical and comparative per-
spectives. 
Limitation and Prescription is the thirty-third contribution to the 
series Comparative Studies in Continental and Anglo-American Le-
gal History. The first band, Englische und kontinentale Rechtsges-
chichte: ein Forschungsprojekt (English and Continental Research 
History: A Research Project) (Helmut Coing & Knut Wolfgang 
Nörr eds., 1985), set the course for the object of the project: to com-
pare various legal topics across jurisdictions and legal systems 
through the commission of essays of the current thinking on those 
topics. In fidelity to those who have reviewed previous contributions 
to the series, which includes one of the editors of this contribution,6 
the second and more challenging goal of the project is for the organ-
izers of each band—who are themselves experts in their fields—“to 
 
contra non valentem. But to be fair, this work does not endeavor to provide a 
comprehensive treatise on prescription. 
 5. See J. Denson Smith, Forward, in 5 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS iii, 459, 
461 (La. State L. Inst. trans., West Publ’g 1972) (citing Jean C. Carbonnier, Notes 
on Liberative Prescription, 50 RTDCiv. 171–81 (1952)). 
 6. See David Ibbetson’s book review of ITINERA FIDUCIAE: TRUST AND 
TREUHAND IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (Richard Helmholz & Reinhard Zim-
mermann eds., 1998), the nineteenth band of Comparative Studies in Continental 
and Anglo-American Legal History, in 4 EDINBURGH L. REV. 244 (2000), wherein 
the reviewer notes of the series:  
Its recipe for success is well-tried: collect together specialists from dif-
ferent jurisdictions, facilitate debate amongst them in a spirit of critical 
co-operation, then publish the papers summarising their detailed re-
searches together with an introduction by the convenor or convenors of 
the group—themselves experts in the field—gathering together the com-
mon themes which have emerged. 




rise above the terminology and technicality of each system of law 
and seek out the points of real similarity and difference,” an en-
deavor requiring “leadership, scholarship, patience and diplomacy, 
not to mention a keen awareness of linguistic and cultural differ-
ences.”7  
Under this framework, the editors’ introduction could just as 
well be an epilogue, save for one important caveat: for purposes of 
terminology, the reader should be cautious not to depart their famil-
iar legal system and wade into the waters of whichever system is 
foreign (civil or common) without some orientation in language—
including language that changes over time. A contemporary civilian, 
for example, might view “prescription” both as a mode of acquisi-
tion of rights (acquisitive prescription) as well as a mode of dis-
charging debts (liberative prescription), just as, for example, Ger-
man law distinguishes Ersitzung and Verjährung. This is so despite 
the fact that early-modern civilian jurists focused primarily on ac-
quisitive prescription in their study of “prescription.” For example, 
Giovanni Balvo’s Tractatus de praescriptionibus and Robert-Jo-
seph Pothier’s Traité de la possession et de la prescription primarily 
focused on acquisitive prescription; Pothier addressed liberative 
prescription separately in his Traité des obligations.8 But the con-
temporary civilian may be surprised to learn that the “Statute of 
Limitation of Prescription” of 1540, as explained in David Ibbet-
son’s examination of early modern English law, only concerns real 
rights (curtailing periods that had become “absurdly long” and re-
ducing them to fifty or sixty years—eye-popping by today’s stand-
ards).9 The study of English law barring actions as a result of inac-
tion is covered elsewhere, in Professor Ibbetson’s study of “The 
Limitations Act of 1624.”10  
 
 7. See Preface in LIMITATION AND PRESCRIPTION: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
HISTORY, supra note 2. 
 8. Id. at 10. 
 9. Id. at 213, 218. 
 10. Id. at 222. 




The editors observe that by the early-modern era, just as the lan-
guage of “limitation” had gained a foothold in the common law, so 
too did it have its place in procedural law.11 This placement in the 
common law is in contrast with civil law jurisdictions, where liber-
ative prescription is generally considered an area of substantive law. 
As such, the editors instruct that there is an important distinction 
“between civil obligations, which the law recognizes and enforces, 
and natural obligations, rights and duties the law merely recog-
nizes.”12 This dichotomy presents a noteworthy comparison both 
within the civil law and between civil and common law. In the civil 
law, the substantive civil obligation is extinguished through the pas-
sage of time. The interpretation of whether the natural obligation 
remains, however, has changed over time in civil law systems. For 
example, in Martin Schermaier’s contribution, Contemporary Use 
of Roman Rules: Prescription and Limitation in the Usus Modernus 
Pandectarum,13 the author observes that medieval jurists rejected 
the notion that a natural obligation remained beyond the civil obli-
gation,14 and later scholars such as Raimond Théodore Troplong 
would agree. This is in contrast with contemporary French and Ger-
man interpretations, where a debtor who mistakenly makes a pay-
ment beyond the limitation period cannot later recover the payment 
because the natural obligation remains.15 In this civil law construct, 
the limitation is still a substantive defense notwithstanding the sur-
vival of the natural obligation. At common law, the limitations pe-
riod is raised as a procedural defense. In both systems, however, the 
defense must be pleaded.16  
With this backdrop, the editors rightly caution that the study of 
limitations and prescription from a Continental and Anglo-
 
 11. Id. at 34, 226. 
 12. Id. at 11. 
 13. Id. at 297. 
 14. Id. at 307. 
 15. Id. at 13. 
 16. There is draft legislation in Louisiana, which is currently under study, that 
would allow for Louisiana courts to recognize sua sponte defenses of prescription 
in certain limited cases involving consumer debt.  




American framework is rife with concepts that do not fully equate, 
such as with civil law acquisitive prescription and common law 
“prescription.”17 Even where there are general equivalents, such as 
between civil law liberative prescription and common law limita-
tion, the effects differ. Justinian was responsible for the “double par-
entage” of praescriptio, combining usucapio as a mode of acquisi-
tion of ownership with praescriptio as a defense of limitation, merg-
ing both institutions into one.18 The marriage makes sense in many 
respects, as both share a similar balancing of interests of claimants 
and defendants, and the tension between social order, legal security, 
and equity.19 On the other hand, as observed in David Deroussin’s 
contribution, Le Droit Français des Prescriptions depuis 1804, ou 
l’impossible simplicité,20 there is considerable disagreement regard-
ing the utility of this merger when many scholars consider liberative 
and acquisitive prescription as “two species” based on “different 
principles.”21  
Considering that “prescription” from either perspective shares 
common roots with Roman law and Canon law, and that it devel-
oped somewhat independently for at least some period of time in 
each of the Anglo-American and Continental law traditions, it is in-
evitable that attempts to harmonize the terminology will prove mad-
dening. There are seldom any perfect translations in an area of study 
replete with rough equivalents and false cognates. In David Ibbet-
son’s contribution, Limitations and Prescription in Early-Modern 
England, he observes that the lack of “common terminology to refer 
to the situations where lapse of time barred or created rights suggests 
strongly that there was no common conception of the lapse of 
 
 17. Id. at 10. 
 18. Id. at 21. 
 19. Id. at 36 (citing, e.g., Bigot de Préameneu’s report to the Corps législatif 
in preparation of the French Code civil, in 15 PIERRE-ANTOINE FENET, RECUEIL 
COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES DU CODE CIVIL 573–75 (1827; repr. Os-
nabrück 1968)). 
 20. Id. at 459. 
 21. Id. at 480. 




time,”22 as he bluntly assesses that “[t]here is little to be proud of in 
the development of the English law of limitation and prescription.”23 
One can quickly appreciate the “leadership, scholarship, patience, 
and diplomacy, not to mention a keen awareness of linguistic and 
cultural differences”24 required of the Comparative Studies project 
and especially with respect to limitations and prescription. Equally 
engaging in this particular band is the extent to which the “good 
faith” (with Canon law roots) is pervasive in the praescriptio, as 
would be required of the likes of Bartolus de Saxoferrato, but vigor-
ously disputed by others.  
Even within each legal system, there are a multitude of different 
grounds for extinguishing rights by the passage of time other than 
just by prescription, such as abandonment, péremption, déchéance, 
and forclusion, délai préfix. Some systems provide for a “long stop” 
period, or a délai-butoir, which is usually distinguished from a per-
emptive limitation. Further complicating matters, the editors note 
that there are at least three different interpretations of determining 
the point of accrual of a limitation period.25 Some of those methods 
are intended to provide for objective certainty, but despite those best 
intentions, courts have determined strict application of the point of 
accrual may violate a plaintiff’s fundamental rights.26 The calcula-
tions relative to the interruption and suspension of prescription, in-
cluding the application of contra non valentem, are no less contro-
versial either. So then, for the neophyte who views prescription as a 
simple application of numbers, one can quickly appreciate that the 
academic study of prescription is not as simple as it seems.  
French jurist Jean Carbonnier once questioned the paradox be-
tween the intense judicial initiative in the field of prescription, 
 
 22. Id. at 213. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at Preface. 
 25. Id. at 39. 
 26. Id. (citing a case where the European Court of Human Rights found that 
the Swiss objective limitation of ten years, which runs regardless of the plaintiff’s 
knowledge, infringed the plaintiff’s right to a fair trial). 




where the jurisprudence is plentiful, and the seemingly scant volume 
of scholarship among commentators who were perhaps “destined to 
slip” by trying to interpret something so “numerical, mathematical, 
[and] automatic.”27 To be sure, commentators have quickly filled 
this void of scholarship over the past fifty years, with much if not 
most of it from a comparative legal perspective (although typically 
only within either the civil or common law framework). But the 
work of Dondorp, Ibbetson, and Schrage is more daring still, as it 
endeavors to explore and synthesize limitation and prescription from 
both a Continental and Anglo-American perspective.  
 
Benjamin West Janke 




 27. Jean C. Carbonnier, Notes on Liberative Prescription, 50 REVUE TRIMES-
TRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 171 (1952), reprinted in 5 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 468 
(La. State L. Inst. trans., West Publ’g 1972). 
